The Client
A Logistics MD Who Felt Watched.
James (not his real name) was the managing director of a mid-sized logistics company operating out of Sydney, with operations across New South Wales and northern New South Wales. The business was his. He had built it from the ground up over fourteen years with thirty-plus employees.
Over the previous several months, something had been nagging at him. Twice, a competitor had responded to tender submissions with pricing suspiciously well-matched to his own. Internal strategies discussed in senior leadership meetings seemed to be reaching the market before they should. An NDA breach was the first explanation considered, but there was no obvious source inside the team.
The Challenge
Told He Was Being Paranoid.
James had mentioned his concerns to his operations manager, who told him plainly that he was being paranoid. With no concrete evidence and no obvious explanation, it was easy to accept that assessment. The events could have been coincidence.
But the pattern continued. A third tender came back with matching price intelligence that James was certain had only ever been discussed inside a single boardroom meeting. At that point he decided to act, but he had no experience in counter-surveillance and no idea where to start. He also couldn't raise the matter broadly inside the organisation in case the source was internal.
What he needed was a bug sweep in Australia that came with proper equipment and proper protocol, conducted by professionals who specialise in commercial TSCM and electronic surveillance detection.
The Investigation
A Comprehensive After-Hours Sweep.
Stirling Investigations was engaged for a comprehensive TSCM sweep of the company's main boardroom and two executive offices. The sweep was conducted after business hours to avoid detection and to ensure no operational disruption to the business.
Our TSCM specialist deployed a combination of RF (radio frequency) detection equipment, a non-linear junction detector (NLJD), and a thorough physical inspection of all structural elements, furniture, and fittings in each space.
What We Found. Within the boardroom, an active RF transmitter concealed inside a standard power-board extension cord, consistent with a commercially available, remotely-monitored listening device. A second device, a standalone audio recorder, was located in a concealed position within the primary executive office. Both devices were documented photographically with precise location notes before removal.
A full written TSCM report was provided detailing the devices found, their likely transmission range and capability, probable operational duration, and recommendations for hardening each space against future surveillance.
